Analyzing Vietnam's 2020 Doing Business rankings reveals that Vietnam's index for protecting minority investors stood at 97 out of 190, dropping 8 places compared to 2019 and ranking behind Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia in the ASEAN region. The practical implications outlined above clearly demonstrate that the mechanisms for protecting minority shareholders in Enterprise Law 2014 have not been truly effective, and in reality, the phenomenon of "big fish swallowing small fish" still occurs. This is one of the reasons why small investors hesitate to invest in large enterprises.
Some opinions suggest that Enterprise Law 2020, which came into effect on January 1, 2021, is a new "shield" replacing the 2014 Enterprise Law in protecting minority shareholders in joint-stock companies. So, does this new "shield" really work? In this article, the author will delve into analyzing the legal provisions as well as conducting practical research and comparing them with foreign laws to present their views and opinions on the ability to protect minority shareholders in joint-stock companies under Enterprise Law 2020.
1. How to understand minority shareholders in joint stock companies
It was once defined in Decree No. 48/1998/ND-CP on securities and the securities market that "minority shareholders are those holding less than 1% of voting shares of the issuing organization." However, since this decree ceased to be effective on December 16, 2003, there have been no provisions mentioning minority shareholders.
Nevertheless, according to Article 4, Clause 18 of Securities Law 2019, a large shareholder is one who owns 5% or more of the voting shares of an issuing organization. Therefore, from a legal perspective, we can understand that "minority shareholders are those who own less than 5% of the voting shares of an issuing organization."
Not only in Vietnam but also in some countries in the Southeast Asia region such as Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia, the percentage of 5% is used to identify large shareholders in joint-stock companies and consequently serve as the basis for determining minority shareholders. [2]
2. Mechanism to protect minority shareholders according to the Enterprise Law 2020
2.1. Property rights group
First, the right to receive dividends
Similarly to large shareholders, Article 135 of Enterprise Law 2020 grants minority shareholders the right to receive full dividend payments within 6 months from the date of the annual general meeting of shareholders and to be notified of dividend payments no later than 15 days before the dividend payment date. This provision ensures that minority shareholders will share in the profits of the company.
However, Vietnamese law, with its spirit of not intervening too deeply into the distribution of dividends by companies, delegates the decision-making authority to the annual general meeting of shareholders, making it difficult for minority shareholders to influence the timing, form, amount, and method of dividend payments. On the other hand, the 6-month period from the end of the annual general meeting is too long for shareholders to receive dividend payments, and if dividends are not received after 6 months, demanding dividends for minority shareholders becomes challenging. The reality of delayed dividend payments for investors is widespread, sometimes hindering investors' investment objectives, especially for those with limited capital.
For instance, Vinaconex Investment and Tourism Development Joint Stock Company has postponed dividend payments nine times from 2010 until March 2021 due to the company's inability to arrange funds. Similarly, Song Da Electrical Engineering Joint Stock Company set a record by changing dividend payment dates 15 times in 2011 and 2012 until June 2022. Various reasons are given by companies to explain the delays, but the common theme is "lack of funds," even after approval by shareholders.
There are sanctions in place, such as “The enterprise will have to pay additional interest calculated at the basic interest rate announced by the State Bank of Vietnam for the amount and period of late payment within 3 months. After the 3-month period, the enterprise will have to pay additional interest calculated at the overdue loan interest rate for the amount of late payment beyond 3 months, and after the 4-month payment deadline, the enterprise will be subject to certain enforcement measures.” [4] However, these sanctions only apply to state shareholders in converted enterprises, while other vulnerable minority shareholders in the enterprise do not receive such protection.
Some shareholders often say, “Receiving dividends... but feeling angry,” referring to the frustration in choosing the form of dividend payment because dividends can be paid in cash, in company shares, or in other assets specified in the company's charter. If dividends are paid in shares, this does not affect the ownership percentage of current shareholders, and the company's shares can be devalued at any time. In addition to the 5% personal income tax when receiving dividends in shares, minority shareholders now have to bear an additional 0.1% personal income tax, along with the time and effort to transfer shares for cash. [5]
Second, the priority right to buy new shares corresponds to the ownership ratio of common shares
According to point c, Clause 1 of Article 115 of Enterprise Law 2020, when a company offers new shares, shareholders have the right to purchase corresponding to the proportion of shares they currently own. However, the standard charter applicable to public companies issued with Circular No. 116/2020/TT-BTC states that “Common shares must be prioritized for sale to existing shareholders in proportion to their ownership of common shares in the Company, unless the General Meeting of Shareholders decides otherwise, the shares not registered for purchase by shareholders will be decided by the Company's Board of Management.” Thus, for public companies issuing shares, the General Meeting of Shareholders has full discretion to decide on the sale of shares to individual shareholders at different proportions, without necessarily adhering to their shareholding percentages in the company. In this case, large shareholders are entitled to purchase at a higher proportion compared to minority shareholders as per the resolution of the General Meeting of Shareholders.
It can be seen that Vietnam's legal framework allowing the charter to empower the General Meeting of Shareholders to decide on the proportion of share purchase does not ensure equal rights among shareholders and seriously infringes on the priority rights to purchase shares of minority shareholders specifically and other shareholders in general under the Enterprise Law.
Thirdly, the right to freely transfer one's shares to others.
Most minority shareholders typically invest in a joint-stock company to profit over a certain period and are not interested in long-term commitment to the company if they choose not to be.
Article 119, Clause 2 of Enterprise Law 2020 stipulates that shareholders are not allowed to withdraw their contributed capital in the form of common shares from the company under any circumstances, but they are permitted to transfer them to the company or to others. Stemming from the organization model based on capital contributions, with a public nature, the capital structure of a joint-stock company is very flexible, allowing for easy conversion without compromising the stability of the capital structure. For this reason, transferring capital within a joint-stock company is not overly complex or difficult for minority shareholders if the transfer is conducted openly and legally. This provision is seen as one that safeguards the property rights of minority shareholders.
Fourthly, the right to request the company to repurchase shares.
According to Article 132 of Enterprise Law 2020, “Shareholders who have voted against the resolution on company restructuring or changes in shareholders' rights and obligations as stipulated in the company's charter have the right to request the company to repurchase their shares.” Typically, only minority shareholders exercise this right because they are more vulnerable to negative impacts and dissent from resolutions of the General Meeting of Shareholders.
Although the law allows shareholders to request the company to repurchase shares as stipulated above, Article 134 of Enterprise Law 2020 only permits the company to make payments to shareholders if immediately after the payment, the company still ensures sufficient payment of debts and other asset obligations. Moreover, the repurchase process itself is quite complex and can take up to 90 days.
Amended Louisiana Commercial Corporation Act 2015 of the United States allows dissenting shareholders to object to the company and grants them the right to request the company to repurchase all the shares they need to sell when objecting to specific transactions of the company. The company will provide shareholders with a proposal regarding an appropriate price based on their share value and submit it back to the company. Based on this proposal, the company has 30 days to make payment, reimbursing shareholders for the value of the shares that the company itself considers to be appropriate considering the impact of the company's transactions. If shareholders are not satisfied with the company's valuation, within 30 days from the payment date, shareholders must notify and confirm the situation with the company. At this point, the responsibility burden lies with the company in executing the legal valuation process of the shares. The amended Louisiana Commercial Corporation Act 2015 also strictly prohibits discounts or reductions in share prices due to the minority position of shareholders or lack of market value. [6]
The amended Louisiana Commercial Corporation Act 2015 is highly significant for minority shareholders and has many advantages in the right to request the company to repurchase shares, from which Vietnam as well as Southeast Asian countries can learn in the legislative process to protect the legal rights and interests of minority shareholders.
2.2. Group of corporate governance rights
Previously, the 2014 Enterprise Law stipulated that “The General Meeting of Shareholders shall be convened when there is a number of attending shareholders representing at least 51% of the total voting shares.” [7] However, in Article 145 of Enterprise Law 2020, this ratio has been reduced to 50%. This has created conditions for minority shareholders to exercise their right to convene the General Meeting of Shareholders more easily if small shareholders cooperate with each other to form a shareholder group reaching the required ratio to convene the first or second General Meeting of Shareholders with 33% [8] , without waiting for the third meeting or the participation of large shareholders.
While Section 2, Article 114 of the 2014 Enterprise Law required shareholders or shareholder groups to hold at least 10% of the total shares for a minimum of 06 months to enjoy special privileges to intervene in the management and supervision of the company's activities, Section 2, Article 115 of Enterprise Law 2020 has reduced this ratio to 5% or a smaller ratio as stipulated in the Charter so that shareholders have the right to request the Board of Supervisors to inspect the company's work, convene the General Meeting of Shareholders, and other activities related to the information rights group. [9] This is also one of the important rights that majority of minority shareholders usually demand approval from major shareholders.
The 2020 Enterprise Law no longer requires shareholders to meet a minimum 06-month deadline to exercise the above-mentioned management rights. Abandoning this provision brings positive changes for minority shareholders because it allows them to have a "voice" right from the moment they are associated with the company's interests, instead of waiting illogically for a period of 06 months during which unfavorable issues may arise.
In addition to the positive changes, the management rights of minority shareholders still have certain limitations:
(i) At point a, Clause 1, Article 115 of Enterprise Law 2020 allows the company's Charter to stipulate other forms for ordinary shareholders to attend and speak at the General Meeting of Shareholders, and in practice, many joint-stock companies have many "other forms" to directly limit the management rights of minority shareholders and indirectly restrict the information rights of minority shareholders.
For example, Vietnam Valuation and Financial Services Corporation VVFC issued a notice in March 2021 inviting shareholders to attend the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders 2021 with the condition that “Shareholders owning 3000 shares or more attend the General Meeting of Shareholders directly. Shareholders owning fewer than 3000 shares must gather into groups of at least 3000 shares and appoint representatives to attend the General Meeting of Shareholders directly.” Everyone can see the "discrimination in the content of this notice" and there are many companies applying this form to limit the management rights of minority shareholders.
(ii) The right to elect members to the Board of Directors, the Board of Supervisors belongs only to shareholders, shareholder groups holding at least 10% of the total shares or a smaller ratio if specified in the Charter. This 10% ratio is still relatively high according to the author, while the rights of ordinary shareholders, shareholder groups in Clause 2, Article 115 of Enterprise Law 2020 have been reduced to only 5%.
In reality, some businesses believe that minority shareholders usually do not have a long-term commitment to the company, so they fear that the company may be disrupted by these shareholders if they are given too much power, while others see minority shareholders as "redundant" when entering the Board of Directors. However, for small shareholders, having representatives in the Board of Directors, the Board of Supervisors is very important because they have the opportunity to voice their opinions and protect the interests of minority shareholders, grasp information, and participate in decision-making on important issues, especially the right to elect members to the Board of Directors, the Board of Supervisors which is related to a series of other rights such as the right to decide, review reports, contracts, transactions, etc. [10]
(iii) Cumulative voting method is considered an important and unique legal tool of joint-stock companies to protect minority shareholders, enhance the presence of minority shareholders in the Board of Directors and the Board of Supervisors, ensure the balance of power and control of the company among shareholder groups. However, the tenure of members of the Board of Directors is not more than 05 years and can be re-elected for an unlimited number of terms, and an individual can only be elected as an independent member of the Board of Directors of a company for no more than 02 consecutive terms[11]. In the case of multiple rounds of elections like this, the cumulative voting mechanism no longer works to protect minority shareholders. With the advantage of voting shares, large shareholders can easily win individual elections like this to put their candidates on the Board of Directors. And the opportunity for minority shareholders to put people on the Board of Directors will be low, leading to the risk of lack of transparency in corporate governance, resulting in financial scandals, abuse of power, and stripping of the company's assets by large shareholders.
2.3. Group of information rights
In Vietnam, the major threat that minority shareholders fear is the exploitation of their positions by company managers for personal gain, which could harm the company at any time. Therefore, points d and e of Clause 1, Article 115 of Enterprise Law 2020 also allow ordinary shareholders to review, inquire, and extract information about their names and contact addresses in the list of shareholders with voting rights; request correction of inaccurate information about themselves; review, inquire, extract, or copy the company's Charter, General Meeting of Shareholders minutes, and resolutions of the General Meeting of Shareholders.
Moreover, instead of shareholders, shareholder groups owning 10% or more of the total shares continuously for at least 06 months as in the 2014 Enterprise Law, point a of Clause 2, Article 115 of Enterprise Law 2020 allows shareholders, shareholder groups owning 05% or more of the total common shares or a smaller ratio as stipulated in the Charter to "Review, inquire, extract records and resolutions, decisions of the Board of Directors, mid-year and annual financial reports, reports of the Board of Supervisors, contracts, transactions that must be approved by the Board of Directors and other documents, except documents related to trade secrets, company secrets." This adjustment is an important step for minority shareholders to immediately exercise their access rights, provide their information, and increase the monitoring ability of minority shareholders over transactions that need to be monitored, such as transactions with related parties to limit asset loss and damage to the company. However, what constitutes "trade secrets, company secrets" under Enterprise Law 2020 has not been clearly explained, which could be an excuse for other shareholders to abuse to limit the information rights of minority shareholders, shareholder groups.
Article 164 of Enterprise Law 2020 also requires members of the Board of Directors, Supervisory Board, Directors or General Directors, and other company managers to declare to the company their related interests within 07 working days from the date the related interests arise. The retention, publicization, review, extraction, copying of the list of related persons and related interests are carried out as follows:
- The company must notify the list of related persons and related interests to the General Meeting of Shareholders at the annual meeting;
- The list of related persons and related interests is kept at the company's headquarters; if necessary, a part or the entire content of the aforementioned list may be kept at the company's branches;
- Shareholders, shareholders' representatives, members of the Board of Directors, Supervisory Board, Directors or General Directors, and other managers have the right to review, extract, and copy part or all of the declared content;
- The company must facilitate the access, review, extraction, and copying of the list of related persons and related interests by those mentioned above in the fastest and most convenient way; they must not obstruct or create difficulties for them in exercising this right. The procedures for reviewing, extracting, and copying the declared content of related persons and related interests are carried out under the regulations of the company's Charter.
- Members of the Board of Directors, Directors or General Directors in their personal or others' names to perform work in any form within the scope of the company's business must explain the nature, and content of that work before the Board of Directors, Supervisory Board, and can only be implemented when approved by the majority of the remaining members of the Board of Directors; if implemented without declaration or the approval of the Board of Directors, all income obtained from that activity belongs to the company.
These regulations have helped the group of minority shareholders to control transactions between individuals of the company's management board and related parties to ensure transparency and fairness in transactions within joint-stock companies. This is also the basis for shareholders to exercise other fundamental rights such as voting rights in General Meetings of Shareholders, the right to elect and dismiss members of the Board of Directors, and even the right to transfer shares in the company.
Especially, after the end of the fiscal year, shareholders who continuously own shares of the company for at least 01 year have the right to directly review reports or, along with lawyers, accountants, certified auditors, review reports such as: Company's business results report; financial report; evaluation report on management and operation of the company; appraisal report of the Supervisory Board [12].
The law grants these rights; however, in reality, for minority shareholders to assess the financial situation of the company and the effectiveness of management through information rights, they must also have a certain level of understanding and expertise. And sometimes minority shareholders also struggle to exercise their rights, as illustrated in the following case:
“Mr. Nguyen Dai L owns 140,000 shares, accounting for 5% of the charter capital of HK Hard Services Joint Stock Company. Despite numerous requests to the company's leadership for documents such as: financial reports, minutes/resolutions of the Board of Directors meetings, business performance reports, financial reports, management evaluation reports, in accordance with the provisions of the Enterprise Law, Mr. L did not receive any documents from the company. This seriously affects the transparency of the company's information activities in general and directly affects the legitimate rights and interests of Mr. L in particular. It was only when Mr. L filed a lawsuit to the competent People's Court to compel the company to provide the requested documents that the company provided the aforementioned documents as requested by Mr. L.” [13]
Furthermore, there are many companies that do not disclose information or do so inadequately or inaccurately. For example, on May 7, 2021, the State Securities Commission Inspectorate issued Decision No. 83/QD-XPVPHC imposing a fine of 85 million VND on Ha Tay Trading Joint Stock Company for incorrectly disclosing the number of resolutions of the Board of Directors in the corporate governance report and for transactions between the company and related parties of internal personnel in the corporate governance report. [14]
According to the Corporate Governance Principles of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) [15], “Financial performance, corporate objectives, ownership of major shareholders and voting rights, policies for the Board of Directors, executives' remuneration, information about Board of Directors members, transactions with related parties, foreseeable risks, issues related to labor and other related rights and obligations, policies and governance structure” are the contents that member countries must comply with.
Since Vietnam is not a member of the OECD, limiting the amount of information to be provided and restricting the percentage of shares of shareholders, shareholder groups who have the right to request information somewhat impedes the purpose of protecting minority shareholders of this group in practice.
2.4. Remedial Rights Group
To address the shortcomings of the 2014 Enterprise Law, Enterprise Law 2020 allows shareholders to exercise their right to request the cancellation of resolutions of the General Meeting of Shareholders if they own 5% or more of the total outstanding common shares, instead of having to own 10% or more continuously for at least 6 months as before. One of the prominent new provisions in Article 2, Article 165 of Enterprise Law 2020 is "Members of the Board of Directors, Directors, or General Directors and other managers who violate their responsibilities as company managers shall be personally or jointly liable to compensate for lost benefits, return received benefits, and fully compensate for damages to the company and third parties." Perhaps this is a provision that investors feel secure and protected when their assets are not used to pay compensation to third parties for the mistakes of company managers.
Furthermore, Article 166 of Enterprise Law 2020 also introduces new changes regarding the right to sue against members of the Board of Directors, Directors, and General Directors, specifically:
(i) There is no longer a requirement regarding the ownership period of common shares by shareholders or shareholder groups. As long as they own at least 1% of the total outstanding common shares, shareholders or shareholder groups have the right to sue on their own behalf or on behalf of the company. Removing the time constraint provides a basis for minority shareholders to request state authorities to intervene and protect shareholders as soon as they invest in the company.
(ii) Not only individual liability can be sued, but shareholders can also sue joint liability against members of the Board of Directors, Directors, or General Directors.
(iii) The scope of the lawsuit is specified, meaning that it can request the return of benefits or compensation for damages to the company or others.
Both shareholders in general and minority shareholders in particular have the right to sue when the individuals mentioned above are involved in the following cases:
- Violating the responsibilities of company managers;
- Failure to perform, incomplete performance, untimely performance, or performance contrary to legal provisions or the company's charter, resolutions, decisions of the Board of Directors regarding delegated rights and obligations;
- Abusing positions, titles, and using information, secrets, business opportunities, other assets of the company for personal gain or to serve the interests of other organizations or individuals;
- Other cases as stipulated by law and the company's charter.
In addition, shareholders, minority shareholder groups also have the right to access, retrieve, and extract company information upon request by the Court or Arbitration, which sets the stage for enforcing the right to sue, ensuring that they have access to necessary and useful information to serve the litigation process.
The provisions of Enterprise Law 2020 in the remedial rights group are seen as a “support” helping minority shareholders to exercise their fundamental rights regarding property, governance rights, and information rights.
Compared to the 2014 Enterprise Law, Enterprise Law 2020 has made breakthrough provisions to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders. The author observes that not only in Vietnam but in other countries around the world, in order to create a “clean” business environment, minority shareholders also need to be recognized by the law and empowered to legally resist the misconduct of major shareholders. Transparent disclosure of information in joint-stock companies will also be the focus for new investors to have a truthful, objective view of the company's operations, thereby feeling confident in pursuing long-term investment goals.
Therefore, the author also makes some recommendations to improve legal provisions for protecting minority shareholders in joint-stock companies in Vietnam as follows:
Firstly, it is necessary to reduce the time companies must spend paying dividends to shareholders from 6 months to a maximum of 3 months from the date of the annual General Meeting of Shareholders, and impose certain sanctions to penalize companies that are "delaying" in paying dividends to minority shareholders, such as fines or additional payments of interest to minority shareholders for late payments corresponding to the delayed period.
Secondly, allow minority shareholders to choose between receiving dividends in "shares" or "cash" to ensure that minority shareholders who need dividend payments in cash can receive their share of profits from investments without having to wait or incurring any additional taxes, fees, or other costs.
Thirdly, in addition to purchasing shares in proportion to ownership, priority should also be given to existing shareholders to purchase additional shares until they decline or do not purchase all, before distributing to other entities outside the company.
Fourthly, reduce the time frame for exercising the right to request the company to repurchase shares from 90 days to 30 days, except in cases where the company is unable to pay, to ensure that minority shareholders can promptly recover their investment capital.
Fifthly, reduce the percentage of share ownership from 10% to 5% so that minority shareholders, minority shareholder groups have the right to nominate individuals to the Board of Directors, Supervisory Board.
Sixthly, there should be stricter penalties for companies that fail to fulfill their obligation to provide information upon legal requests from minority shareholders in particular and shareholders in general.
According to Doing Business over the years, Malaysia is one of the countries that has consistently ranked highly and leads in terms of the minority shareholder protection index. In Malaysia, to protect minority shareholders, one cannot overlook the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG), established in 2000 as a government initiative aimed at protecting the interests of minority shareholders, within the framework of ensuring the effectiveness of the overall capital market operation. MSWG provides a platform and collective voice for both minority shareholders and companies, advising on voting at the General Meetings of listed companies. Therefore, the author believes that in addition to the Vietnam Financial Investment Association (VAFI) and the Vietnam Association of Securities Businesses (VASB), Vietnam should also establish an organization to protect the rights of minority shareholders, where minority shareholders can receive legal support, be represented when oppressed, and concentrate their legitimate interests to enhance the sustainable value of minority shareholders in joint-stock companies.
Each legal provision may benefit one party while posing disadvantages to another. Whether Enterprise Law 2020 truly acts as an effective "shield" for minority shareholders depends on the will, capacity, and application of the law by minority shareholders during the investment and capital contribution process in joint-stock companies.
Above are all the author's opinions and views on the Enterprise Law 2020 in the scope of minority public protection. We look forward to receiving feedback and contributions from readers.
Nguyen Thi Suong – FDVN Law Firm
[1] According to https://www.doingbusiness.org/;
[2] According to Article 81 of Singapore Company Law 2006, Article 136 of Malaysia Company Law 2016, Article 18 of the Philippines Securities Regulations 2000 and Article 86 of Thailand's Company Law 2008;
[3] https://thanhnien.vn/tai-chinh- Kinh-doanh/hon-10-nam-mon-moi-cho-co-tuc-1315575.html;
[4] Clause 3, Article 3 and Clause 4, Regulations on management and use of the Enterprise Arrangement and Development Support Fund issued together with Decision No. 21/2012/QD-TTg dated May 10, 2012 of the Prime Minister government;
[5] Clause 4 Article 10 Circular 111/2013/TT-BTC, Article 16 Decree 65/2013/ND-CP amended by Clause 9 Article 2 Decree 12/2015/ND-CP and Article 16 Circular 92/2015/TT-BTC;
[6] See https://lawreview.law.lsu.edu/2015/04/07/minority-shareholders-receive-increased-protections-under-new-louisiana-corporate-law/;
[7] See Clause 1, Article 145 of the Enterprise Law 2020;
[8] See Clause 2, Article 145 of the Enterprise Law 2020;
[9] See Clause 2, Article 115 of the Enterprise Law 2020;
[10] See Article 153 and Article 170 of the Enterprise Law 2020;
[11] See Clause 2, Article 154 of the Enterprise Law 2020;
[12] See Article 175 of the Enterprise Law 2020;
[13] Judgment 19/2019/KDTM-ST dated June 11, 2019 on the dispute between company members and the company of the People's Court of Hanoi;
[14] https://laodong.vn/lanh-te/cong-bo-thong-tin-sai-lech-mot-cong-ty-bi-xu-phat-85-trieu-dong-906535.ldo;
[15]https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/f05f4bff-81c1-4f41-a689-0bf68ec03b49/G20-OECD+CG+Principles_English-Vietnamese+by+IFC.pdf?
MOD=AJPERES&CVID=lAAQVAw;
[16] See Article 151 of the Enterprise Law 2020;
[17] See Clause 2, Article 147 of the Enterprise Law 2020;
[18] See http://www.mswg.org.my/.
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